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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
that consent can be revoked up to the time of the decree.9 An alternative
procedure for placing a child with an agency for adoption is for the mother
to surrender the child to an officially approved welfare agency. The sur-
render agreement includes a grant of authority to the agency to consent to
adoption. The statute authorizing this practice is silent on whether or not
the agreement is revocable. In Kozak v. Lutheran Children's Aid Society'0
the Ohio Supreme Court held that such an agreement could not be re-
voked by the natural parent. While the decision may be advisable as a
policy matter, it seems dear that there is also a policy argument in favor
of interpreting the surrender of custody statute in such a way as to make
it consistent with the adoption statute.
HUGH A. Ross
EQUITY
In 1955 the appellate courts of Ohio in considering matters of an
equitable nature were most active in problems concerning contempt of
court.
In North American Aviation v. United Automobile, Aircraft & Agri-
cultural Implement Workers of America,' a temporary restraining order
was in effect. One order had been had against defendants to show cause
why they should not be punished for contempt. On the morning of the
day that the defendants were to show cause further disturbances occurred at
plaintiffs plant where the strike, which had given rise to the restraining
order and the show cause order, was in progress. When the hearing opened
the plaintiff called the court's attention to these disturbances and with
consent of the court, but over the objection of defendants, presented evi-
dence tending to establish that a second violation of the restraining order
had occurred. The -basis of the defendant's objection was the failure to
comply with Ohio Revised Code section 2705.03, which provides that "a
charge in writing shall be filed with the derk of the court" before a show-
ing of contempt which occurs out of the presence of the court may be made.
On the morning of the following day the plaintiff did file such a charge
relating back to the evidence received the previous day. In a court of
appeals decision a majority of the court held that "the reception of the
testimony ... prior to the actual filing of written charges, was within the
sound discretion of the trial court and was not prejudicial to the de-
fendants." 2 It is difficult to see how this procedure can be reconciled with
9OHio REv. CODE § 3107.06.
0 164 Ohio St. 335, 130 N.E.2d 796 (1955), reversing the Cuyahoga County Court
of Appeals decision reported in 124 N.E.2d 168 (1955).
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the express languagi of the statute. The majority opinion makes no at-
tempt other than the above quoted statement to do so.
In re Wright's Estate3 brought to the court of appeals the question
whether a direct contempt of court had been committed. In an action to
reopen a supposedly completed probate proceeding of a deceased's estate
it was called to the attention of the probate court that the administrator-
attorney for the estate had also served as attorney for one of the claimants
against the estate. The motion to reopen the estate had alleged this serving
in a dual capacity and stated that movants believed that a contempt had
been committed. It was held that the motion as stated did not constitute a
charge of contempt of court such as would be necessary -before punishment
could -be imposed for acts committed out of the presence of the court. It,
therefore, constituted error for the probate court to impose punishment for
contempt.
State v. Compton4 considered the assessment of penalties for violation
of an injunction issued in a labor dispute. The appellate court held that
it was proper for the trial court to assess costs against defendants who were
found guilty of violating the injunction in addition to assessing the maxi-
mum penalties allowable by statute. "Sections 11887 and 11888,r pre-
scribing the penalty for disobeying an order of injunction, are not exclusive,
but are cumulative with Sections 12137, 12142 and 12147, General Code,"
relating to contempt and the punishment therefor." The court did, how-
ever, find that it was error to remand the defendants to jail until their fines
were paid in addition to sentencing them to the maximum jail term allowa-
ble by statute.
In Fidelity Finance Co. v. Harris7 an attorney filed certain papers which
contained affidavits required -by law. The attorney signed the affidavits, or
caused them to be signed, with a name of a non-existent person and ac-
knowledged them as a notary public knowing of the manner of signing.
This was held to be an act within the presence of the court so that the
attorney was subject to summary punishment for contempt under Ohio
Revised Code section 2705.01.
The word "court" in the field of law is a comprehensive term. It
represents the judicial department of government which operates by the
method of establishing a tribunal composed of one or more judges at-
1124 N.E.2d 822 (Ohio App. 1954).
'Id. at 825.
'123 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio App. 1954).
'96 Ohio App. 541, 123 N.E.2d 43 (1953).
'Now OHIO REv. CODE S 2727.11 and 2727.12.
'Now OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2705.02, 2705.05 and 2705.10.
T126 N.E.2d 812 (Ohio App. 1955).
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tended by proper officers and employees for the public administration of
justice. The judge does not constitute the court. The court, in addition
to the judge or judges, is composed of the jury, clerks, bailiffs and other
attaches, together with the court room and other rooms and halls used for
the conduct of the business of the court. When any part of the court is
engaged in the prosecution of the business of the court, in accordance with
law, the court is there present!
The Supreme Court of Ohio held in Cleveland Trust Co. v. Bouse9 that
"where an executory contract for the sale of real property is -breached by
the vendor, the purchaser is entitled to an equitable lien for the amount
he 'has paid on the purchase price."'10  The purchaser's lien is recognized
by some twenty jurisdictions in the United States and is, as the court says,
"a salutary rule and one that should be adopted in Ohio." The vendor's
lien has long been recognized 'by the courts of Ohio and is now a matter of
statutory enactment." It would seem that there is as much justice in
providing the purchaser with the lien device for recovering money which
he has invested in a transaction for the sale of real property as there is in
providing the vendor with a companion device for the obtaining of money
which he 'has been promised under the contract.
In Butcher v. Kagey Lumber Co.12 it was held that the vendor in a
contract for the sale of real estate, before conveyance, retains the legal
title and has an interest in the real estate to the extent of the unpaid pur-
chase price. The vendor may assign such contract and this interest which
is retained 'in the real estate to another. If the assignment is for a valuable
consideration and bona fide the rights of the assignee in the real estate are
superior to the rights of a subsequent judgment creditor of the vendor.
In Eggers v. Morr13 it was held that when persons who were dissatisfied
with a zoning ruling concerning their property had by statute a right to take
an appeal to the court of common pleas they had an adequate remedy at
law and, therefore, could not bring an independent action in equity to en-
join the carrying out of such order. No lack of jurisdiction was alleged in
the petition for the injunction but rather that the administrative agency
had acted "arbitrarily and capriciously." The court in refusing plaintiff's
'Id. at 814. See also, State v. Compton, 96 Ohio App. 541, 123 N.E.2d 43, 48
(1953). The deputy sheriffs appointed by virtue of a prior restraining order of the
court "were officers of the court ..... Consequently, it may well be said that viola-
tions of the injunction in the presence of these deputies was in the presence of the
court and that they would have been justified in making arrests for a violation thereof
on the spot."
'163 Ohio St. 392, 127 N.E.2d 7 (1955).
"Id. at 10.
"
1OHIO REv. CODE § 5301.26.
12164 Ohio St. 85, 128 N.E.2d 54 (1955).
" 162 Ohio St. 521, 124 N.E.2d 115 (1955).
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action for an injunction considered and rejected the further daim that
because numerous parties occupied the same position as the plaintiff and
because they resided fifteen miles from the office of their attorney it was
an undue hardship for them to prepare and file the direct appeal within
the fifteen days allowed by statute. "Mere inconvenience is never an ex-
cuse for failure to avail oneself of a legal remedy."
In Harmon v. Carson14 an action brought for rescission of a contract
of purchase of a business failed because plaintiffs had not tendered back
certain assets obtained under the contract. The court reserved to the
plaintiffs their right to proceed in an action at law for damages. Plaintiffs
thereupon moved for judgment for damages based on the court's findings
of facts. A court of appeals held that the trial court was correct in overrul-
ing such motion. "A court of equity will not grant compensatory damages
when they are not given as an incident of some other equitable relief...
Where the court refuses to grant equitable relief, as in this case, all it can
do is reserve the plaintiff the right to bring an action at law for damages."
In Flynn v. McHugh15 plaintiff was the owner of a four apartment
dwelling. Being of advanced years plaintiff entered into an agreement
with defendants, her nephew and his wife, that she would deed them the
property and retain a life estate in herself. The consideration provided
by the defendants as stated in the deed was one dollar and other good and
valuable consideration. However, it was orally understood that defendants
would move into one of the apartments of the building, provide mainte-
nance, of the building, pay certain -upkeep costs and provide personal ser-
vices needed -by plaintiff due to her age and physical condition. As so
often happens in such an understanding the arrangement worked amicably
for only a short time. Subsequently, plaintiff brought an action for can-
cellation of the instrument. A court of appeals affirmed the judgment for
defendants entered by the trial court. One allegation by the plainiff was
that she was fraudulently induced to -believe that the provisions regarding
services were contained in the deed whereas they were not. The court
found the evidence insufficient to support this contention saying that to
set aside an instrument of solemn character, evidence of a clear and con-
vincing character was needed and that a mere preponderance of evidence
was not enough. The court also recognized the principle that cancellation
of a deed will not be given for mere breach of contract when failure to
perform all or part of the consideration was not expressly made a ground of
forfeiture.
EDGAR I. KING
198 Ohio App. 363, 129 N.E.2d 394 (1954).
"98 Ohio App. 393, 129 N.E.2d 848 (1955).
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